A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTUALS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT

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Intellectuals are one of the most important elements is the politics of developing nations. Recently, an appreciable quantity of literature has appeared on this subject. A quick survey of this literature will demonstrate that, although there are a host of propositions, there is not a theoretically integrated body of knowledge on the role of intellectuals in the politics of developing societies. In this paper, an attempt will be made to reintegrate and reevaluate the existing information in the framework of some new conceptual propositions. Thus, it is hoped to achieve a theoretical unity and explain the role of intellectuals in the process of development.

Definition of intellectuals are taken as an important starting point. After discussing several definitons, a definiton of writer's own, the one which supposedly has more merits, is introduced. Then, a central proposition is introduced which forms the backbone of the whole study. Throughout the paper, an attempt is made to find out social and psychological basis of the conflicts of intellectuals. Special care is given to show by what means these individual conflicts become social phenomenon.

This study aims to cover transitional societies in general. References are frequently made to several transitional societies. Concepts are developed and analyses are made in the context of these societies. Despite all his efforts towards impartiality and objectivity, the author feels that the model of the transitional society, its characteristics and problems may disproportionatly bear the imprints of the Turkish society. Only consolation is that, this is an unavoidable risk in most social science studies. Especially in the theoretical ones.

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I — WHAT IS AN INTELLECTUAL?

In an article on intellectuals, to open the subject with a long discussion of the definiton of intellectuals should not be consider- ed as pedantry. Because, there is not an agreed upon definiton of intellectuals, and definitions have influence on the treatment of the subject matter (Nettle, 1969 : 53-54).

The problem in the definiton of intellectuals may be rising from the following sources :

— The term "intellectual" has entered into daily life with strong emotional connotations. Depending on the culture of a certain coun- try, people have quite different pictures of intellectuals in their minds. This arttitude may have an influence on the orientation of the scholar.

— General conceptualization of the intellectual makes the writ- er feel that he is an intellectual. Thus, he has to study himself and his own kind. This goes against the traditional understanding of ob- jectivity in science. He may start seeing himself in the controversy over intellectuals. Since his audience is intellectuals in general, this puts another pressure on the writer.

— Intellectuals can originate from any stratum or class in the society and may be functioning in very diversified parts of the so- cio-political structure. The fluidity of intellectuals through social structure makes their definition quite hard.

— Intellectuals play a predominant role in the politics of devel- oping nations. Since the phenomenon and study of development is in itself very controversial, intellectuals receive a similar treatment.

1 — Different Pictures of Intellectuals

Different national cultures, experiences and political move- ments seem to create different pictures of intellectuals. To get an idea about these different pictures can be useful, both to recognize the problem of definiton and to have a feeling about the controversy in this area.

A — The Negative Picture

Anti-intellectualism is a common phenomenon both in conser- vative and socialistic ends of the political extremes. One difference is that, while conservatives hold their anti-intellectual approach consistently, in the socialistic wing we can see changes or differ-

ent views. Usually, at the beginnig of the socialistic struggle, intellectuals are favorably accepted because they play a very important role in the development of the class consciousness of the people. In most of the cases, intellectuals themselves are the originators and the leaders of the struggle, but their class origin keeps them continually suspect. For example, Lenin supported the movement of the student intellectuals in his "The Task of Revolutionary Youth" (1903). He called them "the most responsive section of the intelligentsia." But after a while he became disillusioned with the student youth and in articles such as "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution" (1907) and the "The Student Movement and the Present Political Situation" (1908) criticized students because of their class origin.

On the other hand, for conservatives, the intellectual signifies revolutionary change, socialism, far-out ideas, atheism, etc. Consequently, the conservative holds on to his anti-intellectual ground to the end. Thus, the intellectual is not at home in either camp. This creates one of his frustrations which we shall study later.[1]

B — The Positive Picture

The positive picture of intellectuals has two sources: on the one hand socialists paint a positive picture, on the other hand some sociologists offer a rather constructive concept of the intellectuals.

For the socialists, the intellectual has the role of developing the political consciousness of the proletariat. He has a sense of historical development, ability to empathize with the masses, and the will to pursue his ideological interests in the practical world affairs. An intellectual is a social critic who should be "the moral conscience of his society" (Mills, 1963 : 611; Baran, 1965 : 10).

Often, sociologists give a rather positive picture of intellectuals, because they see a function for them in the social structure. They are important, according to Lewis A. Coser (1965 : x), because they create and maintain the modern culture. Sociologists see the intellectual as a social role category. Intellectuals create and maintain the symbols for the society. They criticize the existing order and picture the possibilities of more desirable tomorrows.[2]

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(1) Writers like Huszar (1960 : 308-309), Michels (1962 : 293), Wolf (1963 : 57), Aron (1957 : 230), Hoffer (1963 : 42), Kristol (1967 : 594), can give a clear idea about the negative picture of intellectuals.

(2) On this account the following sources can be illustrative; Parsons (1969 : 3-25), Shils (1969 : 25-49), Lerner et al. (1965 : 203), Hamshire (1969 : 231).

2 — Efforts to Define Intellectuals

A — Constitutive Definitions

(a) Definitions by the Social Structure

Kari Mannheim (1936 : 155) gives the most important of the structural definitions. Referring to Alfred Weber's terminology, "the socially unattached intelligentsia", he uses the term **"relatively classless stratum."** Besides this stuructural definition of intellectuals, Mannheim uses the role and personality variables. He assigns to intellectuals the important role of synthesis in an age of social disintegration. His concept of synthesis involves the synthesis of theory with practice as well as the synthesis of different viewpoints. As far as the personality variables are concerned, Mannheim (1956 : 118) points out the "empathy" or "social sensibility" (1936 : 157) as very important characteristics of the intellectual.

(b) Definitions by Role

Talcott Parsons (1969 : 4) sees the intellectual as serving a "cultural specialist role". For this, he accepts an analytical independence between social and cultural systems. According to Robert Merton (1968 : 263), " 'the term intellectual' refers to a social role and not to a total person." D. Lerner, I. D. Pool, and G. K. Schuller (1965 : 203) tend to define intellectuals as symbol manipulators.

(c) Definitions by Personality Factors

Paul Baran makes a distinction between the specialists and intellectuals. He calls the specialists "intellect workers". The basic characteristic of the intellectual is seen as his inclination to interconnect things in the totality of the historical process and the social system in which he lives. Besides this characteristic, Paul Baran (1965 : 238) assigns him the characteristic of being an open social critic, telling the truth, and "carrying on rational inquiry to wherever it may lead."

(d) A Phenomenalistic Definiton

J. P. Nettl (1969 : 53-125) is critical of all previous definitions. According to him, institutions, roles, social structures, even men as such cannot be ground for definition. "It must be defined from inside out, from certain types of ideas **toward** certain categories of idea-articulators..." (1969 : 55). He divides the relevant types of

ideas into two : quality and scope. By relating the idea of quality and scope to social structure, Nettl (1969 : 63) attempts to define the intellectual.

B — Operational Definitions :

One important difference between the several operational definitions center around the distinction between the intellectual in the developing society and the intellectual in the developed society. When the Western World is under discussion, scientists and artists are taken as intellectuals. In the case of developing societies, intellectuals can be university graduates, teachers, or even students.[3]

3 — A Contextual Definition ·

A — The Question of Context :

Most of the definitions have a problem on the cotextual plane. Especially in constitutive definitions, writers do not bother to state in what context they perceive the intellectuals.

A constitutive-contextual definition will be developed here. It seems that there are two aspects of the context in which the intellectuals function : (a) political v.s. non-political context, (b) socio-political context.

(a) The political context is the one in which intellectuals are directly involved in politics. Their primary aim is political in this context. In non-political context, the primary aim of the intellectuals is cultural activities. Art and science can be the ways to achieve this aim. Symbol manipulation is not (as several authors claim) the primary aim of the intellectual's functioning. It is only an incidental result of their cultural activities.

To be sure, cultural activities have political results, and political activities are bound to have cultural results. Our distinction does not aim toward exclusiveness, but it is a matter of degree and emphasis. This distinction aims to demonstrate which activity has the **primary** importance in the life of the individual.

The second point which should be brought about this distinction is that, **intellectualism in itseif demands that cultural activities**

(3) Shils (1960 : 340). For a similar definition, see : Kautsky (1964 · 44 - 45), Examples of several other operational definitions can be found in the following sources : Friedmann (1960 : 520), Brinton (1965 : 42), Mao (1965 · 303).

be given importance. But especially in the developing nations, we can see that political activities gain the primary importance. There are several reasons for this.

The first reason is that the pressure of political problems is too great to be ignored by anyboldy, especially by the intellectuals. This phenomenon leads to the extreme politicization of the public in developing nations. Intellectuals cannot be immune to these political pressures and actually they are the ones who are most af fected.

The second reason is that the nature of developing societies tends to create important psychological confiicts for the intellectuals. These conflicts in themselves push the intellectuals toward extreme politicization, and political activities become a primary function for them.

The third reason is that there is not a highly developed functional specificity in the developing nations. Contrarily, there is a functional diffusion. This functional diffusion facilitates the change of primary function from culture to politics for intellectuals. But, intellectuals are not the only ones who change their socially assigned function and adopt politics as the primary functional goal. The military and bureaucracy have similar transformations. Both of them are able to adopt politics as their primary aim and to take their formally assigned function as secondary.

This functional diffusion and the resultant political activity of the intellectuals can lead us to two conclusions. The firt one is that a role conflict develops for the intellectuals between their cultural and political roles. This role conflict results in high frustrations, and they start blaming the socio-political system for their frustrations. This frustration leads them toward higher political involvement, and higher political involvement leads them toward more severe role conflict. This is only one of the dilemmas which will be studied later in this paper.

The second conclusion is that the political involvement of the intellectuals may lessen when an underdeveloped nation advances on the road toward development, because development (in political-social-economic senses) brings functional specificity by itself. A developed economy, and a political system based on it, cannot function without a precise division of labor and functional specificity. This tends to drive intellectuals out of active politics, and they

adopt cultural roles as their primary function. Their political functi-
on then becomes secondary. Thus, in a sense, the intellectuals are
working themselves out of their political role. When their aim of de-
velopment succeeds, their influence in politics will be lessened.
Their success in politics will result in their failure in politics.

(b) The above discussion leads us to the importance of the so-
cio-political context. Each analyst, according to his goals, may treat
a different socio-political context, but the most important socio-po-
litical context, and the most useful one for the analysis of this study,
is the distinction between the developing and developed nations.

For the intellectuals which will be studied in this article, the
context is set as follows: **political** intelligentsia in **developing socie-
ties** are our subject. The following definiton will tend to cover this
phenomenon -under these restrictions.

B — Definition

One common feature of the definition of intellectuals in the
literature is that the question is taken as a dichotomy. Whatever the
context may be, some people are taken as intellectuals, others are
taken as non-intellectuals.

In the firs place, this type of a dichotomy does not correspond
to reality. It is the opinion of this writer that **there are degrees of
intellectualism.** A continuum of intellectualism will be presented
here for definition rather than a dichotomy. The conceptualization
of intellectualism as a quality which we can find in different persons
in different degrees is a more refined analytical tool than taking
some persons as intellectuals and contrasting them with non-intel-
lectuals. Those whom we may call non-intellectuals still may tena
to have some degree of intellectualism. Comparisons of persons who
have different degrees of intellectualism can produce better results
in empirical research and theoretical analysis than the comparison
of intellectuals with non-intellectuals.

This definition of intellectuals will depend on four variables.
Each variable should be considered as being on a scale from min-
imum to maximum. The higher the cumulative score of the varia-
bles on the scales, the higher the intellectualism for the case at hand.
The degree of intellectualism of a person can be determined accord-
ing to the combination of the scores he achieves on each scale
of the variables. This naturally will tend to produce an ordinal scaie
in the analysis of the subject.

The four variables of intellectualism are these: (a) System Cons-
ciousness, (b) Empathy, (c) Political Perfectionism, (d) Critical Ori-
entation. The proposed definition can be shown schematically as
follows :

Scores (Minimum)	Variables	Scores (Maximum)
....	System Consciousness	....
....	Empathy	....
....	Political Perfectionism	....
....	Critical Orientation	....

Total Scores:	Minimum degree of intellectualism	Intermediate Levels	Maximum degree of intellectualism

Now let us attempt to see the importance of these variables for
the definition of political intelligentsia in developing societies.

(a) System Consciousness[4]

What is meant here is awareness of social reality and the pos-
session of a sense of history. Baran expresses this phenomenon as
an important concern with "the entire historical process" and "ef-
fort to **interconnect** things". And in the terms of Mannheim, the in-
tellectual position "calls for a peculiar alertness towards the his-
torical reality of the present."

System consciousness, for an intellectual, calls for two levels
of consciousness. On one level, he should be able to relate the so-
cio-political-cultural phenomena to each other. When he sees real-
ity in pigeonholes, he achieves the level of a specialist. He should
be able to perceive the social phenomena as a system with all its
subparts, interdependence, and complexity. This would tend to be
the case in the relationship of the international system to the na-
tional subsystem; as well as in the social, cultural, economic, and
political subsystems' relationships to the national system.

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(4) In the social science literature, the "holistic" or "general systems" approach
     are used to describe the similar behavior. A different name is used here, be-
     cause the holistic or general systems approach connote an **intentional scien-
     tific** method. What is meant here by system consciousness is a state of mind
     which leads toward a particular political behavior.

The second level of consciousnesse is related to the historical process. The intellectual would be able to make sense out of the historical process. This helps him to develop a vision for the history of the future. A historical consciousness can give the intellectual a chance to assess his society's situation in the world and can give a feeling that socio-political change is possible and exciting. Historical consciousness is necessary for cultural relativism. A conscious socio-political development cannot be achieved without a feeling of cultural realtivism.

Intellectuals receive this system consciousness by their study and reflections. They are prone to be exposed to different cultures and subjects. Besides mere studying, certain personality types can help to create the mentality of system consciousness. Some people simply hate to deal with details. They want to treat questions in global terms and try to see their interrelationships to other problems. Probably this type of personality would be best suited to the development of system consciousness.

Besides these reasons, the "relatively classless stratum"⁴ position of intellectuals can help them to develop a wider view of social reality (if we accept that the perception of reality is influenced by the position in the social space) than the persons perceive themselves to have definite class positions. Another explanation for system consciousness would be the tradition of intellectualism (which is very strong in most of the developing societies) which emphasizes the explanation of reality in the widest possible terms instead of piecemeal explanations. Also, there is the situation of the intellectual between developed and underdeveloped worlds. He may be raised in one, and trained according to the standards of the other. These conflicting influences broaden his perspective and help him to gain system consciousness.

His system consciousness both motivates him toward political leadership of developing nations and makes him indispensable for development itself.

(b) Empathy

Empathy is the ability to see the world with somebody else s eyes. This is one of the important components of intellectualism.

Several reasons can be stated for the development of empathy in the intellectuals. There is a correlation between socio-psychological mobility and empathy. A person who moves in different socio-

psychological levels of society gets to know each level, and could empathize with the people in each level more than a person who lacks this type of mobility. Intellectuals are the people who have this kind of mobility.

Another important reason for empathy is the system conscious- ness of the intellectuals. Since they are able to see the whole, they can understand the relationship of components better. This under- standing leads them toward empathy. A reason for empathy which is associated with system consciousness is the understanding of cau- sality in social reality. An ittellectual, because of his system con- sciousness, tends to analyze the situation of an individual or a group in terms of system. If there are problems in the society, for him the fault lies in the system. Disappointment of the intellectual in the face of concrete events is directed toward the systems, leaving a free hand and heart for him to empathize with the victim as he sees it.

A further reason for empathy of the intellectual is his education. It seems that education in itself produces empathy. When we read, we are exploring in somebody else's mind; we are trying to under- stand the writer's feelings and motivations. Reading is an excellent exercise in empathy. Moreover, the objective information that is provided by reading helps the development of empathy. The reader comes to know different cultures, languages, religions, and socie- ties. This takes him out of his narrow etnocentrism. For example, Danial Lerner (1958 - 96 - 98) found in the Middle East that educa- tion and empathy have important correlations.

A final reason for the development of empathy can be the in- volvement of the intellectuals in artistic work. Art in itself requires the sensitization of the individual toward the environment he is liv- ing in.

In the context of the developing societies, empathy is an extreme- ly valuable leadership tool. It can work in two levels. On the na- tional level, intellectuals can empathize with different social strata or groups. Because of this ability, intellectuals can analyze the sit- uation of the social groups quite well and can make use of them in the struggle for social change. Intellectuals can develop strong feelings toward underprivileged groups and this can lead toward populism and socialism in these societies.

On the international level, empathy is useful for the political intelligentsia. The intellectual is familiar with both developed and

developing societies. He can **feel** the world culture and its direction. When he wants to borrow something from the world culture and incorporate it into his own culture, he does not feel as if he is borrowing something alien. He does not have the apprehension of a conservative toward foreign cultures. This flexibility, which is the product of empathy, makes him a suitable leader for development.

(c) Political Perfectionism

The intellectual's basic preoccupation with abstractions leads him to emphasize the importance of **principles** in politics and de-emphasize the practical limitations of political life. This attitude is reinforced by the "reference model" concept which will be developed later in this paper.

They want to see society as "perfect" as the one they build in their mind. All the daily compromises of political life are steps taken away from this future perfection.

This attitude prepares the ground for the doctrinaire politics of intellectuals (Michels, 1960 : 317 - 318).

(d) Critical Orientation

One of the most distinguished qualities of intellectuals is their critical orientation. Existing social, political and cultural orders are under the constant fire of criticism coming from intellectuals. Their political perfectionism is one of the reasons for critical attitude. The gap between the ideal and reality produces this critical attitude.

System consciousness is another reason for their critical attitude. They are able to see, understand and compare their society with more developed societies. Moreover, in their own society they are able to comprehend and analyze the interrelatedness of socio-political phenomena. More importantly, they are able to relate themselves and their work to this whole social system. When one of the important subparts of the socio-political subsystem fails, they tend to criticize the other parts of the system as well. Their system consciousness prevents them from seeing the failure of one subpart as an isolated phenomenon. This tendency makes criticism a pervasive and largely inclusive weapon in the hands of intellectuals.

4 — Discussion of the Proposed Definition

As it may be seen, above definition (like most other definitions) is a union of rather arbitrarily chosen elements. Reliability and de-

pendability of the above proposition are yet to be seen. Moreover, the internal consistancy of the proposed definition should be affirmed by empirical testing as well.

It can be argued that, this definition has some advantages over the ones which are studied previously in this article. These are :

— Assumptions and limitations of the definition are made quite clear.

— The simplistic assumption of dichotomy is replaced by an idea of continuum.

— In nature, this is a constitutive definition. But, it readily lends itself to operationalization and empirical research.

II — SOME CONCEPTUAL PROPOSITIONS

1. The Central Proposition

An attempt will be made to develop an integrated conceptual structure to explain the politics of intellectuals in developing societies. This conceptual structure will develop around the following central proposition : **Intellectuals feel conflicts in the context of the transitional societies. To resolve these conflicts, they orient themselves toward extremist politics.**

Before going any further, we should clarify some of the key concepts in this proposition.

What is meant by conflict is the psychological state of the individual under the influence of forces which pull him toward mutually incompatible alternatives of behavior.

The conflict situation leads individuals toward frustration. This is an unhappy state to be in. There are several avenues through which the individual may resolve the conflict and return to a relatively balanced state.

This can happen in two levels. In the first level there are task-oriented reactions. These are aimed at realistically meeting the demands of the situation. Attack, withdrawal, and compromise are the elements of this situation.

The second level involves the ego defensive mechanisms. Denial of reality (escapism), fantasy, rationalization, projection, repression, reaction formation, undoing (atonement), regression, iden-

tification, introjection, compensation, displacement, emotional insu-
lation, isolation (intellectualization, dissociation), sublimation, sym-
pathism and acting-out are some of these mechanism (Coleman,
1964 : 94 - 108).

Intellectuals may attempt to get rid of the conflict (or reduce
its impacts) by employing one or several of the above mentioned
avenues.

To adopt the task oriented reactions, individuals should feel
the conflict on the one hand, and relate this conflict to the socio-
political structure on the other. If they feel the conflict but are
unable to relate it to the socio-political structure, they are not going
to produce important and direct political results, and in this case
they may adopt one or several ego defensive mechanisms. Herein
lies the difference between the socialization of the conflict (its being
directed toward a social object or end) or personalization of the
conflict.

The qualities of system consciousness, empathy, and critical ori-
entation which we suppose constitute the intellectual personality
would help him to socialize his conflict. He would look for the causes
of his unhappiness (and the unhappiness of others, through empathy)
in the social system. Thus the resolution of his conflicts and of the
society's conflicts would be in the change of the social system.

The idealistic attitude of the intellectuals would push them to-
ward the attack type of reaction more then toward the compromise
type. Compromise is a dirty word in the vocabulary of some intellec-
tuals. They see compromise as the tool of the politician who acts and
lives daily without the guidance of respectable principles.

The politics which are oriented toward the change of the entire
political system under the guidance of long term principles (ideolo-
gies), are the extremist politics. The psychological state which pro-
duces "attack" type of behavior, focused on the socio-political sys-
tem is one of the sources of the extremist politics.

At this point we should make a distinction between the critical
attitude as it was indicated previously and extremist politics. Extrem-
ist politics foresees a comprehensive action program, it is future
oriented, and takes place in groups. A critical attitude does not
necessarily foresees a comprehensive action program, it is orien-
ted to the present state of affairs and it is individualistic. The con-
cept of critical attitude is not necessarily a cognitive part of the

intellectual's self-awareness, but it is a personality disposition. in contrast, extremist politics is a consciously recognized way of action in groups. Critical attitude indicates passive reaction to the undesirable stimuli of the environment, while in extremist politics this reaction gains an active characteristic. These distinctions should be considered carefully to avoid a circular argument between our definition of intellectuals and the central proposition of this paper.

It can be expected that the stronger the conflict, the higher the frustration; therefore, the more extremist the politics. This type of a relationship can lead to nihilistic activities.

A note of caution is necessary here. The extreme form of conflict may not necessarily lead to the most violant political extremism and change. Under these conditions of conflict the individual may spend most of his psychic energy on the lowest degree of integration of his psychic and physical systems, and thus not have enough psychic energy left for political activities. In this case, his ego defensive mechanisms would be functioning at a pathological level.

It seems that the positive correlation between conflict and frustration created in transitional societies and extremist politics, exists up to a certain level. After that level the two variables may either have no correlation at all, or the correlation may be negative.

It should be pointed out that the task-orinted reaction and the ego defensive mechanisms are analytical distinctions. In the real life situation both sets of variables can be functioning simultaneously and can be acting on each other.

The following questions can be determined only empirically: (a) Up to what point does the conflict and frustration produce extremist politics, and after what point does this correlation disappear or become reverse? (b) Under what situations can we find the particular combinations of task-oriented reactions and ego-defensive mechanisms?

The fashinable term "alienated intellectual" is a result of these conflicts. Since we are dealing with developing societies, we will try to see the basis of this alienation in the context of the developmental problems.(5)

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(5) The concept of alienation has so far developed in the institutional, economic, social and political context of the Western societies. Alienation has to be re-examined in the context of developing societies. This is an important subject calling for its author.

This certainly does not mean that there is no alienation in "developed" societies. For intellectuals, there are reasons for alienation -with important consequences- in developed societies also. But our concern here is with transitional societies.

There are several studies which support the above generalization. For example, Daniel Lerner (1958 : 370) found that in Iran the extremists are also unhappy people. An index of social dissociation, which was aimed at measuring alienation, showed that the extremists were alienated people. Extremists also had broader social horizons in contrast to moderates. This indicates their high system consciousness and empathy.

Ringer and Sills (1952 -- 53 : 689 - 701) came up with similar findings about Iran. They found that the political extremists, as a group, came from urban environments, were well educated, from the middle economic stratum, and were personally discontented -this in contrast with non-extremists. Extremists, in spite of their social detachment, are much more apt to have broad social horisons than non-extremists. The extremist is a man for whom traditional concerns have relatively low saliency. They could develop as innovative leaders.

Alienation of African intellectuals led them toward extremist politics of nationalism (Andrain, 1964 : 189). Alienation of Japanese students led them toward nihilism. Feuer (1969 : 209 - 210) points out that there is a relationship between high suicide rate of the young people and their extremist politics. In the "normal" countries the suicide rate tends to be higher among the older people. R.C. North and I. D. Pool (1965 : 320) points out that the "culturally alienated intellectuals" played an important role in the Chinese revolution. Friedmann (1960 : 530), Toynbee (1947 : 394, F. W. Riggs (1964 : 150 - 152), and Mary Matossian (1968 : 173 - 182) all see a relationship between the unhappiness of the intellectuals of the developing society and their extremist politics.

2 — The Analytical Tools

To analyze the social basis of intellectuals' psychological conflicts, three sociological concepts will be employed: reference groups, status incongruency, and role conflicts. These concepts will be explored briefly.

A — Reference Groups :

The reference groups, as simply defined by Sherif and Sherif (1964 : 55), is "the group with which the individual identifies or aspires to belong." Of course, it is an old idea that individuals act in the frame of reference groups. But individuals orient themselves to groups other than their own, and Merton (1968 : 234) points out that this is the point which differentiates the reference group from other types of groups. This brings up the problem of membership and non-membership groups and of how individuals relate to them.

"In general then, reference group theory aims to systematize the determinants and consequences of those processes of evaluation and self appraisal in which the individual takes the values or standarts of other individuals and groups as a comparative frame of reference." (Merton, 1968 : 234).

Sumner proposed an in-group (we-group) and out-group (other-groups) dichotomy. According to him the out-group was the object of hostility and exploitation. The reference group theory takes another view, claiming that the out-group, under certain conditions, may become the basis of the positive reference. "... the science of sociology is thereby committed to determine the conditions under which one or the other orientations (hostile-positive) to out-groups obtained (Merton, 1968 : 277). Newcomp (Merton, 1968 : 300) points out that there are posivite and negative reference groups. Motivated assimilation or motivated rejection of reference group norms are the basis of negative-positive reference group distinctions.

The auther of this paper does not fully agree with this distinction of negative-positive reference groups. Usually there are ambivalent feelings toward reference groups. The choosing of a group as a reference group in itself implies the acceptance of the superiority of this non-membership group. Acceptance of a person's (or a group's) superiority is not without compensation. To maintain their self-respect, individuals in membership groups have to find some negative aspects of the reference group. Thus, negative and positive feelings would tend to be directed toward the non-membership group simultaneously.

This combination of negative and positive feelings can work in various ways. To give a couple of examples off-hand, it can be said that, it is possible to adopt ona part of the reference group while rejecting the other part in contempt. (Accepting the Western tech-

nology but rejecting its culture and other norms.) Another way is to adopt some parts of the reference group but to claim it was indigenous anyway. (Most of the nations which adopted the parliamentary system claim that they had one or another form of participatory decision making in their traditional culture, so they are not taking something alien, but merely developing on the logical lines of their own culture.) (Coleman, 1971 : 342). It is also possible to reject a reference group in word but accept it in deed. The suppression of hostile feelings is also possible, but this may end up in an unexpected explosion or can be satisfied through expressive means (like art works, satire, or jokes against the non-membership group.)

The concept of reference group could be useful in the study of conflicts of intellectuals in the context of the developing societies. This poses two problems.

The first problem is whether or not we can accept the community of intellectuals in an underdeveloped country as a group in the sociological sense. An affirmative answer can be given to this question. Their number is not usually very high in transitional societies and they concentrate in one or two metropolitan areas. Each one of them may not know ail the others, but they usually have a fairly close acquaintance with large numbers of intellectual friends. These groups tend to interact and information spreads, usually very quickly. Athough they may frequently differ on the strategies of political action and severe debates may create antagonistic sub-groups, they have one aim in common: drastic socio-political change (usually along socialistic lines.) An attack on their ranks from conservative circles is met by uniform reaction. Group cohesion is fairly high.

The organizational structures usually tend to reinforce their group characteristics. University circles, groups formed around daily or weekly publications, legitimate or underground political parties are these type of organisations. Usually these organizations are not isolated from each other and their interaction can have a cumulative tendency to reinforce the group characteristics. Thus, we should tend to take the intellectuals as an in-group or membership group circle.

The second problem is whether or not we can talk about reference groups for the intellectuals. As an answer to this question, we can propose a concept of "reference model" instead of refer

ence group. We do not want to disregard the deference group theory completely as it is, but it would have a rather limited use for our purpose. In this paper, the reference group theory and reference model as we proposed will be used in different places as the conditions of analysis demand.

The sources to which the intellectuals refer are extremely varied, diversified and too wide to employ the concept of reference group. The developed world (and sometimes the developing societies like the People's Republic of China or Cuba) can be the sources of reference. There is no justification for calling this source of reference a "group" in the sociological sense. For populist intellectuals the oppressed people of their land can be a source of reference, again, this is not a group.

The intellectual is a person who has the capacity for abstraction and conceptualization. For him, the important thing is not a reference group as such, but some of the qualities which he can abstract from this group to built the scheme of a perfect society in his mind. His source of reference can be in the depths of the history of his country (a golden age) as well as in the distant future. Because of his mental abilities of abstraction and conceptualization, he prefers to refer to a model in his mind rather than to imperfect realities. When he refers to reality he either uses the reality to justify what he has in his mind, or may completely alter reality to satisfy the reference model he holds. This is why too many French intellectuals prior to the 1789 revolution referred to Iran, Russia, or China as the examples of perfect countries.

Thus, there are two reasons to substitute the concept of reference model for the concept of reference group: (a) the sources of reference of the intellectuals often do not form "groups" in the sociological sense, and (b) the mentality of the intellectuals is more inclined to work with an abstracted group concept.

In spite of these differences, the basic ideas in the reference group theory apply to the concept of reference model and can be used in the analysis of the conflicts of the intellectuals.

The reference model differs from the reference group in the following ways: (a) Level of abstraction: Tne reference model tends to be much more abstract than the deference group. The reference model may or may not be a group in the sociological sense. If there is a group in the sociological sense, but the conflict created be-

cause of this reference group is high, then the mechanism of ab-
straction will start working and the perception of the reference group
will be transformed into a "model" level. In other words, abstraction
works as a means to reduce the conflict by transforming the reality
into an ideal state or model. This is the process by which ideologies
develop, and this is why intellectuals play an important role in the
development of ideologies.

To prevent misunderstanding, it should be pointed out that,
we do not equate the reference model with ideology. All we say is
that the reference model is an intermediate state between the per-
ceived conflicting reality of the daily life and the imagined har-
mony of a distant future.

(b) The reference group, because of its sociological bounda-
ries, is restricted and defined by the conditions of time and space.
The reference model, because of its more abstract qualities, can
transcend these boundaries.

B — Status Incongruency

Status is the differential rating of positions in the society. Rev-
everence, esteem, and the importance a person feels in the society
come from the status he perceives he has in the social hierarchy.

Status factor, a somewhat different concept from position, can
be used to analyze the status incongruency. Malewski (1966 : 303)
and Homans define the status factor as everything which distin-
guishes an individual from others. Income, family origin, profession.
education... can be examples of status factors. These factors can
be high or low in a society.

Johan Galtung (1964 : 96 - 97) describes status incongruency
in a schematic form. For the sake of simplicity, he chooses only
two positions to deal with the criteria of rank: high and low. He re-
fers to them as **topdog** and **underdog** positions (T and U). For high
and low status factors (or rank critaria as Galtung calls it) we could
have the rankings of TTTTT and UUUUU. In this case we would
say that there is status congruency between the two positions in
this social space. If one or more of the U's from underdog posi-
tion are transferred to the topdog position, or one or more of the
T's from topdog position are transferred to the underdog position,
we would have status incongruency. (In the literature the terms
such as rank-equilibrium and rank-disequilibrium, or status consist-
ency and status inconsistency are used for the same purpose.)

Johan Galtung claims that status congruency creates stable social structures. The cast system in India, the feudal system in the Middle Ages, slavery in the last century U.S.A., and concentration camps in Germany were examples of status congruency systems. The oppressed people in these systems did not revolt. Preoccupation with physical survival, lack of means to revolt, lack of vision were probably the reasons for this stability. On the other hand, development of status incongruency can be seen as one of the causes of aggression and radical politics. (See also : Lenski, 1966 : 88).

The differential treatment a status incongruent person receives may lead him toward extremist politics. Moreover, status incongruency provides a person with particular ability and resources for change oriented politics. One psychological result of the status incongruency is the ability of the individual to think of himself in terms of higher classes as well as lower classes. This provides empathy for him. His having high and low status factors simultaneously is the basis of empathy. His ability to empathize with the ruling classes gives him the political motivation. (D. Lerner has found that the poor peasants are not even able to imagine themselves as rulers. This lack of empathy prevents the lover class person from becoming involved to change oriented politics.) On the other hand, the person with status incongruency can empathize and communicate with the lower class masses also. Because of this ability he can recruit large numbers of allies for his political aims. This is why the "relatively classless" and "free-floating" intellectuals can be agents of change. They are located in a very sensitive part of the social structure.

Another important result of the status incongruency for political change is the knowledge, experience, and ability their situation provides for the individuals. Their in-between situation offers the knowledge and abilities which other parts of the social system do not provide. (This is especially true for intellectuals, because the status factor which ranks high in their case is education.) The capabilities to organize, to propagate, to convince, to develop ideologies, to analyze, and -relative to the lower classes- to provide material means, are the weapons held by the persons in this in -between state.

Reference group theory and the status incongruency concept can be treated in combination and this seems to provide interes-

ting possibilities for analysis. For example, we can take the problem of the selection of non-membership group. In the literature, there is no clear-cut description of this process. We can presume that a non-membership reference group is selected because of its high prestige (topdog) position. But the U group is not going to select this T group as a reference group until it has at least some (one or more) qualities of the T group. This is necessary to provide the minimal empathy for the non-membership reference group.

On the other hand, different types of prestige groups may provide different reference groups. Sometimes the apparent incompatibility between different reference groups can have its roots in the incongruent status factors which make up the membership group.

To be able to understand why some qualities of non-membership reference groups are preferred to others, we have to study the values of membership reference groups in the context of social system in which they function. Trying to differentiate between different T's of a non-membership reference group can provide a resourceful analytical device. Thus we can see the process of reference and assimilation more clearly.

C — Role Conflict

Without going into any discussions and comparisons we can adopt the definition offered by Katz and Kahn (1966 : 179) "A role consists of one or more recurrent activities." Conflicts created by different roles and role-senders will be covered in this article.

3 — The Sources of the Conflicts

In this section, the different sources of the conflicts of intellectuals will be studied. Four variables will be presented here as the sources of their conflicts : international context, socio-political context, historical context, and personality dimensions.

A — International Context

The international context is the most important variable of all. The "underdevelopment" of developing nations is in relation to the "developed" nations. Thus most of the conflicts intellectuals feel have their roots, one way or the other, in the international context.

In this context, several status factors play an important role in establishing the prestige of a nation. Economic status factors

can be illustrated in terms of per capita income, GNP, economic development rate, degree of industralization, rate of inflation, soundness of money... Probably the per capita income and economic development rate are the most important status factors. Political status factors can be efficacy, influence, and relative independence of a nation in international affairs. Size of territory and population, strength of the army, and a respectable historical past are among other status factors.

The nation which have high economic and political status factors tend to become reference models for the intellectuals of the developing nations.

As it was pointed out before, the reference model in this sense produces ambivalent feelings. To protect their self esteem, the developing nations' intellectuals tend to reject some parts of their reference model while accepting other parts.

This can be one of the reasons for the strong nationalistic feelings among developing societies today. Nationalism in itself emphasizes the superior qualities of the in-group in relation to the out-groups. It may seem paradoxical, but strengthened self esteem by high nationalistic feelings makes it easier to internalize a reference model. In other words; strong nationalism in itself means scoring high on one of the status factors. This is so, because (a) nationalism is a **modern** phenomenon (T factor), (b) it also gives the illusion that a nation has or could have T's on other status factors. Since we know that our perception is more important than the reality itself in the formulation of our behavior, the "illusion" effect of nationalism can be quite influential.

In the previous section we also came to the conclusion that, (a) to push for change, the underdog should at least have one or more of of the T factors, (b) also to choose a reference model the underdog should have at least one or more T factors of the reference model. The T factors provided by nationalism opens the way for the two effects mentioned above.

Thus nationalism plays a double role in the process of referring to non-membership groups. (a) It plays a tension reducing role. Tension develops because of the conflicting feelings of xenophobia and xenophilia under the influence of the reference model. This tension in itself gives the feeling of insecurity and vulnerability to the intellectual. A strong sense of nationalism tends to reduce

these feelings, giving a reliable and acceptable reference point to the individual. (b) Strong nationalism also increases the desire to adopt new models from outside (because it provides high T factor and relative emotional security), and paves the way for new conflicts and tensions.

It can be presumed that this interaction pattern will continue until the nation reaches a high level of development and achieves a feeling of security and self reliance.

To be sure, the xenophobia directed to the Western world has its roots in the colonial, semi-colonial, and neo-colonial experiences of the developing world as well as the reference model idea. This double impact makes the xenophobia very real and throughgoing.

Socialism, in addition to nationalism, develops as another mechanism to provide modernization without losing self esteem of the developing nations. Socialism is an excellent device for solving the conflict between the xenophobia and xenophilia because; (a) although it is Western in thought, it rejects the present state of the Western societies, (b) it also brings the possibility of skipping the capitalistic way of development and reaching (accroding to the socialistic understanding) a higher form of social organization in a shorter time. This means that the developing nations would be able to surpass the West (higher T's) without having to imitate it. Socialism also provides a map and justification to adopt some of the Western ways (progressive sides of them) without losing self estem of the developing nations.

The above mentioned conflicts and tensions apply to the intellectuals of developing nations more than any other group. In the first place they are trained in Western culture. This makes them understand the high status factors of the Western societies better than others in their own society, and they can compare these high status factors with the low status factors of their society. Their identification with their own society and understanding of the Western societies introduces them to these conflicts.

They have the highest contact with the West. As students, government officials, or in cultural activities they always meet their Western counterparts. They tend to know foreign languages and to follow international events. This constant contact with Western countries (or developed nations in general) continually reminds them of their own status.

In addition to the above mentioned reasons, intellectuals have their individual status incongruency. They achieve high in some of the status factors (education, professionalism) and low in other factors (economic factors, sometimes family background, in some cases political power). This status incogruency makes them unhappy and therefore change oriented in the context of their own society. But when they have contact with the modern nations, this contact introduces another low status factor to their standing (being from an underdeveloped country). As a result, their status incongruency tends to increase toward the negative and the resultant tension increases. They may tend to project their individual status incongruency and its associated tensions onto their own society. As it was mentioned above, developing nations have their own status incongruency problems. When this national status incongruency is coupled with the personal status incongruency of the intellectuals, there can be high tensions in the national and international poli-tics.[6]

Kendall (1956 : 277 - 289) found strong nationalistic feelings among Egyptian professionals. But their nationalism is also ambiv-alent and indecisive. This is basically a result of their ambivalent feelings toward Western countries. They feel (a) social inferiority, (b) their old glory as the center of culture made them more sensi-tive to the new realized inferiority, (c) because of their situation they have self-doubts. D. Lerner (1958 : 248 - 251, 342, 362 - 363) found the same feelings of insecurity and ambivalent feelings among Egyptian, Jordanian, and Iranian intellectuals. In india (Bendix, 1964 : 231 - 244), in Africa (Andrein, 1964 : 189 - 191; Han-na, 1964 : 13; Feuer, 1969 : 221), in China (Schwartz, 1961 : 171 - 177) there is the same pattern of reaction against the West.

It seems that, colonization and white-negro dichotomy in-creases these conflicts. An African intellectual, in addition to the problems of culture and development-underdevelopment dichotomy, finds his color to be another source of low status factor (Ziégler, 1964 : 72). Color, as a status factor, cannot be compromised or ig-nored .One must either accept it or reject it. The rather definite quality of this conflict may end up in more nationalistic and extre-mist politics.

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(6) Following sources can be illustrative : Padhye (1960 : 432), Toynbee (1947 : 394), Sharabi (1957 : 189).

From the above discussions, following generalizations can be deduced.

(a) The intellectuals who belong to a developing nation which has a glorious past (high status factor) would tend to feel stronger conflict than the intellectuals who belong to nations which do not have a glorious historical past. (Of course the intellectuals in the countries without a glorious past can have higher conflics on other accounts; e.g., race.)

(b) Other things being equal, a relatively high per capita income can introduce strong conflicts (because it is a high status factor.) In very low income levels (if other status factors are low also) we may not be able to find strong conflicts and frustrations. But when the income level rises somewhat and other status factors remain on the same old level, this may bring conflicts and needs for radical change.

(c) If the lowering impact of the modern world is strong on one of the most valued status factors of the underdeveloped nation, this can bring change faster and starting from the subject of this particular status factor. What happened in the Ottoman Empire illustrates this point. Military strength is a status factor which Turks hold very highly. The Ottoman Empire started its reformist movements as a result of the military defeats, and the initial change was directed toward military reforms. Interestingly enough, the Ottomans and the Turkish Republic suffered from the economic setbacks more deeply than from the military defeats. But they did not seriously consider economic reforms until recently, because economic activity does not constitute a high status factor in the Turkish culture.

(d) If a nation is surrounded by low status nations, it would tend to remain an underdeveloped nation, because it would tend to take its neighbours or relative nations (ethnic or linguistic relatives) as its closest reference models. Since a nation will not feel status incongruency under these conditions, the initiative for change will not develop.

In addition to others, this is one reason why large sections of the world are inhabited by nations which have similar levels of development.

There are some exceptions to this generalization :

. In an underdeveloped country, intellectuals do not take their neighbouring underdeveloped countries as their reference model. Modern nations tend to become reference models for these intellectuals. This in itself would be sufficient reason for an intellectual to feel stronger conflict than some of his other compatriots; the intellectual would be the subject of status incongruency while other people in his country would be taking an equally underdeveloped nation as their reference model.

. Racial and cultural minorities may not take the neighbouring underdeveloped nations as their reference model. This is one of the reasons why these minorities can play important roles in economic and cultural change of these nations.

The high economic development of South Africa can be understood in this context. The white minority in South Africa did not take their underdeveloped black neighbours as a reference modei; their reference model was the European countries.

The situation of Japan poses a rather interesting question. Why was this country able to develop in the midst of other underdeveloped nations? Some of the reasons for this come from the historical realities of Japan. In the first place, Japan was a closed country for a long time. She did not have close relations with outside "barbarians". Because of this closedness she did not take any one of her neighbours as her reference model. When she was awaken form her pleasant dream, she met with the modern nations instead of with her underdeveloped neighbours. Since she had no emotional commitment to her neighbours that might lead her to take them as reference model, it was easy and even natural for her to take the modern states as her reference model.

The rapid modernization of Japan spoiled the emotional balance in this region of the world. A status incongruency developed between her and other states in this area. If we remember that other Far Eastern nations are closer to Japan racially and culturally than they are to Westerners, we can understand how this status incongruency could be intensified. (Because there are highei number of common T factors between Japan and Far Easterners than between the Western nations and Far Easterners.) The strong appeal of Communism in this region of the world as a rapid tool of modernization can have its roots in this status incongruency developed between Japan and her neighbours.

In the same way, the strong appeal of the extremist politics (especially Communism) in the relatively underdeveloped regions of Europe can be explained by the strong influence of status incongruency and reference model. Today's communist or would be communist states felt that they were culturally European (high status factor) but economically backward (low status factor). Since they took developed European nations as their reference model, this led to conflict, tension, and extremist solutions.

B — Socio-Political Context :

Although the international context is important as the starting point of the intellectual's conflicts, these conflicts take place in the context of the society he lives in. This is why it is very important to analyze the social setting of these conflicts.

A transitional society is torn between the conflicting requirements of change and stability. There can be very few areas in a transitional society which are not touched by these requirements. Transitional societies have to rise general level of mobility for modernization, while trying to keep the level of mobility low to provide for social and political institutionalization (Deutsch, 1964 : 493 - 514; Huntinton, 1965 : 386 - 430). They have to preach equality while increasing the gap in income distribution to provide for capital accumulation. They have to save and invest large percentages of national income while there is a strong propensity for consumption. In the rural areas people live in primitive conditions. Yet ten miles away a city can shine with all the glamour and miseries of the twentieth century. These two societies in one country can have the most shocking impact on the psychologies of the people in their respective quarters. Conflict between traditional (religious) educational institutions and modern educational institutions, between traditional law and secular law, between old and new cultural symbols, between exploiter and exploited is extremely strong. Schools educate people who do not have a function in the society; on the other hand the majority of the people are illiterate. To be able to resolve all these conflicts, these societies need strong national governments. But their governments are usually weak.

Undoubtedly, intellectuals, being as the most perceptive, empathic, and responsive section of the population in their milluc, would be influenced most from these general characteristics of their societies.

Now we can turn to the specific sources of the conflicts intel-
lectuals feel in these societies.

a — Structural Reasons ·

It can be proposed that, some of the intellectuals' conflicts
have their basis in their weak class affiliation. Social class defines
our position in the social space. Our views, values, reference points
are formed according to our class affilitions. Results of empirical
research also tend to support this proposition.(7) We define the
social world around us by the perspectives provided by our social
class. But the relatively classless (unattached) intellectuals do not
have definitly established social class perspectives.

This may have two results :

. The first is that the intellectual is psychologically relatively
free from the biases of the class mythologies. He can relatively
easily adapt to any point of view, or ally himself with any class to
define his world. This provides a high socio-psychological mobility
for the intellectual and a cross-class sensitivity. This can be, as
Mannheim points out for the Western societies, the basis of his
integrative ability in socio-political sphere. In the context of the
transitional societies, the same ability can be used to achieve pro-
found social changes.

The second result is the frustration of the intellectual, beca-
use he cannot define himself and his environment with the stable,
valued, and recognized symbols of a social class ideology. This
failure of self definition is one of the reasons for the identity crises
of the intellectuals in these societies.

To solve his problem of identity, the intellectual tends to es-
tablish alliances with other classes. In this century, this alliance is
more and more with the lower classes. But being an outsider with
a rather undependable record of alliances, his new class com-
rades look upon him with suspicion. To overcome this suspicion, in-
tellectuals tend to over-commit themselves to the ideology of the
classes with which they have allied. This is one of the reasons for
the intellectuals' radicalism.

The classless situation of the intellectual does not give him
symbolic justification to seek political power in the society. This

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(7) For a good summary of some of the research on this field, see : Bowen
    (1968 : 61 - 83).

poses an interesting practical problem for the intellectual. If he wants to hold political power, he is condemned as a status seeker, power hungry, and traitor (to his allias). If he does not seek political power, then he is usually condemned as a coward, a traitor (to his ideals), and an ivory tower intellectual.

The second structural variable which produces conflict, tension and leads toward identity crises is the discontinuity in the socialization process. To be sure, discontinuity in the socialization process could be found in developed and traditional societies also. But the discontinuity in transitional societies is much sharper than the discontinuity in traditional and developed societies. This sharp discontinuity comes from the nature of the transition in these societies, because it occurs unevenly and in a relatively short time period. Some parts of the social system change faster than the other parts. The contradiction between these uneven changes lead toward discontinuities in the social system and in the socialization process as well.

In the social structure two levels of socialization can be identified :

aa — Primary group socialization,

ab — Secondary group socialization,

aba — Educational institutions,

abb — Political and administrative institutions, associations, and economic organizations.

aa — Primary Group Socialization

In these groups, socialization is directed to the traditional objects of the culture and carried out by the symbols appropiate to these objects. The traditional understanding of family, religion, sense of time, cosmology, causality, interpersonal relations, relation of man to universe and his society, sexual values, state and the international world are imprinted on the small child.

The primary group relationships change more slowly than the secondary group relationships in the society. The most frequently quoted concept of "cultural lag" shows itself in the change of primary group vs. secondory group relationships. In a transitional society, the primary group relationships would tend to lag behind, showing the characteristics of a transitional society.

Of course, some families would tend to transform themselves faster than others. The families which are in the "modern" sector of the transitional society would tend to exhibit the symbols of a modernized family more than the families which live in more traditional sectors would do. But some points should be carefully considered in this discrimination.

Although the families in the modern sector may present the symbols of "modernisim" in their attitudes, in a very subtle way, they may (and usually do) retain the traditional behavior patterns. This can be considered as one form of formalism.

The gap between the symbolic front put forward by "modernized" families and their actual behavior pattern in itself creates conflicts and cultivates the seeds of identity crises for the second generation of moderns who find themselves born into this dual standard. This may be one of the reasons for the extremist atti-tude of the children of the middle class in these societies.

For the modernized sector children there is a gradual in crease of discontinuity, for the traditional sector children there is a sharp confrontation with discontinuity. What are the effects of these two types of discontinuities on the psychological make-up and political behavior of these children? This is an interesting question which can be investigated by empricial research.

ab — Secondary Group Socialization

The secondary groups are much more accessible for manipulation and planned change than the primary groups are, and as a result they generally can change faster than the primary groups can. This provides for uneven changes as a basis of discontinuity in the socialization process.

aba — Educational Institutions

We are concerned here with the institutions which give modern education. This type of education tends to bring its own cultural symbols, new explenations for the place of man and woman in the society, different ideas about cosmology and the relation of man to the universe. In Parsons' terms, achievement orientation, universalism and specificity tend to replace ascriptive orientation, particularism, and diffuseness.

Educational institutions tend to change faster than other institutions, becanse :

. they are cheaper to impliment;

. teaching (usually) stays on the abstract level; as long as the thorny problems of application do not exist, things can be thought away in the theoretical level;

. the universal authority of science stands behind the modern educational institutions as a means of legitimization, and the achievements of technology work as an undisputable instrument toward that end.

For these reasons, education often can be the most modernized sector of a transitional society.

The unavoidable conflict between the modern educational socialization and the primary group socialization in a transitional society leads the student who receives the modern education to an identity crises. He has to define his environment with consistent symbols and value systems, but the two basic sources of his normative frame of reference are in conflict.

Under this condition there can be several ways to act. One is the suppression of the conflict. In this case, his ego defensive mechanism would start to work. This can result in paranoid behavior. The second way would be to recognize the impass he is in, than to attack the relevant sources to solve his conflict. To solve the conflict he can attack the modernizing forces as well as the traditional forces. Obviously this would be the difference between the left and right radicals. Recognition of the forces at play in the international arena would make the intellectuals attack the traditional forces more than the modernizing forces and institutions. Thus the ultimate impact of the international context is the development of leftist radicalism.

Since Freud, the determining effect of early childhood training on personality formation is a widely accepted idea. For the discontinuity of socialization as we studied, this theory has important implications. If a child is socialized in the traditional sector of the society with symbols and values of his primary group, his subconscious personality with be dominated by these influences. His basic personality traits will be in the direction of his early primary group trainnig. Later on in life, when he receives modern schooling, his conscious perception of himself will be formed according to these modern standards. This is such a basic dilemma that, no matter what he does, it will be quite hard to solve it. With this extremely

sharp discontinuity in socialization, we may be creating one of the most unhappy generations on earth.

In traditional societies, loyalty to the primary group tend to be a very important value. The child who goes to the modern schools learns that his loyalty should be directed to the much more abstract concept of nationhood. In addition to this conscious awareness of the conflicting directions of loyalty, he is socialized in the behavior patterns such as universalism and achievement orientation which undermines the loyalty ideology of the primary groups.

Since his basic personality develops through the primary group training, when he accepts the training of the modern education he starts to feel like a traitor. He feels that he does not possess the inherently high culture of his people, their wisdom and way of doing things. He is an alien, an isolated stranger, even a traitor in the midst of his own people. The psychological basis of the populist movements can be found in this attitude. The intellectual who feels that way turns to the people to find the "truth", to gain from their "wisdom" and to prove that he is not a traitor. This same psychological state pushes him toward socialism. When his "back to the people" movement fails, the pendulum swings back and brings him to elitism.

Under these conditions, a quite obvious identity crisis develops. The sharp conflict between the primary group training (which supplements the subconscious personality and a whole system of symbols to support this personality) and the modern   educational training (which develops the conscious personality and its symbolic-normative justifications) poses the important question of identity for the individual. Most of his efforts from then on center on the painful but necessary process of defining himself in the context of his society.

abb — Political and Administrative Institutions, Associations, and Economic Organizations.

In this section, the secondary groups, in which an individual involves after his educational process, will be considered. Most of these groups have one or another form of socialization process. This socialization can be a process directed to the particular ideology of an organization as well as to the ideology of the dominant political system in the society.

These secondary groups cannot be transformed as fast as can the educational institutions, because they have the function of application which educational institutions do not have. Application of an abstract idea to the existing realities in itself brings the necessity of compromise. On the other hand, the secondary group can be transformed faster than the primary group. This is so, because they are :

. Bureaucratic organizations with clear-cut goal structures. This makes their plannig and conscious manipulation much easier than that of the primary groups.

. Values and sentiments associated with bureaucratic organizations are weaker or less important for individuals than the values and sentiments associated with primary groups in transitional societies.

The above reasons make the induced change of the secondary groups easier and less objectionable than that of the primary groups.

Thus the bureaucratic organizations which are considered in this section stand between the educational institutions and the primary groups, as far as the speed of chage is concerned. One result of this intermediate position is formalism. The secondary groups to which we address ourselves in this section have the ideals and symbols of educational institutions (highly modernized sector of the society) and practice in terms of primary group needs and requirements (traditional sector of the society). This formalist inconsistency has its roots in the structure of the transitional societies.

Another result of this position is the low esteem attached to politicians. As brokers, they tend to compromise between the ideal stemming from the educational institutions and the conservative reality of the primary groups. As a result they do not receive respect from either sector of the society.

Alienation of the intellectuals from the political system is the third result. This alienation develops in two levels. On one level, intellectuals feel that the formalistic inconsistency is in conflict with the values they acquired in educational institutions. On another level, they feel that a political system based on compromise will not be able to solve the problems of development and of reform which require decisive action.

Thus the tension which come from the conflicts intellectuals feel tend to be reduced by directing hostility and desires for drastic change to the political system. The political system can mean two different things for the intellectuals in this stage :

. One of the important causes of their conflicts, and so an object of drastic change to reduce their conflicts.

. Objectification of their conflicts in a social organization. Since the formalist inconsistency a political system adopts has its roots in the contradiction between the ideal (introduced by educational institutions and enforced by the requirements of the international system) and reality, it has a configuration with respect to the conflicts of intellectuals. Because of this configuration, the intellectual may tend to project his feelings of hostility toward the political system instead of directing it toward himself.

Up to this point, two structural rasons are studied: the relatively classless stratum concept and discontinuity in the socialization process. A third structural reason is the status incongruency an intellectual feels in the context of his own society.

The intellectual is usually a person who achieves high in one important status factor : education. Even if he does not go through the formal educational institutions, he would be considered as having a high status factor as a result of his relevant cultural activities. He usually would tend to hove low status factors in other fields, such as income, wealth, political pover... The resultant status incongruency would tend to create conflicts and an attitude in favor of the radical political activity.

b — Role Conflict

The political intelligentsia has conflicting role requirements. They are trained to be professionals, bureaucrats, artists, teachers... But they take politics as the most serious of all of their occupations. There is an extreme politicization among the intellectuals of the developing nations. Almost everything is judged and evaluated from the angle of politics.

As was pointed out previously, lack of specialization is one reason for this role conflict, which is felt on two levels. On one level, the role senders constantly reminds the intellectuals of their appropriate role in the society. Students are told to go to their schools as students, not to carry guns or political leaflets, but to

carry pencils and text-books. Teachers and bureaucrats are constantly reminded that they have to obey the law of the land which limits their political activites as employees. Professionals are reminded of their professional ethics. Artists are told that they do not know aynthing about politics and they should not confuse the minds of the people by using meaningless radical jargon.

On another level, the individual himself feels the role conflict even if he does not pay any attention to the role senders. The ethics of his profession or job which he internalized during the education period disturb him when he involves himself in political activities obsessively. This feeling is probably stronger in artists. Extreme political involvemenet does not permit them to develop their artistic qualities or to work on arts. On the other hand, as a result of high politicization in society, people tend to read political literature more frequently than artistic works. His original conception of himself as an artist ant final self picture as a political activist is a conflicting situation for him.

c — Elitism - Populism Conflict

As was pointed before, guilt feelings of the intellectuals stemming from their perception of themselves as "traitors" push them toward populism. They want to achieve social change by persuading people, by developing their political consciousness, and by recruiting their political help.

But when their populist ideals fail, they turn to the elitism. They decide that change will be for the people but in spite of them. They adopt the elitist attitute in despair. Still they have guilt feelings, and elitist attitudes can only aggrevitate these feelings. Moreover, intellectuals are usually indoctrinated in the desirability of democratic solutions for social problems during their study in educational institutions. This ideal of democracy conflicts with the elitist attitude. But usually they come to believe that a paternalistic (or dictatorial) solution is the quickest way out of the conflicts of the underdevelopment, and in the long run it is going to be beneficial for the people.

The conflict between populism and elitism dominates the political activities of the intellectuals and contributes to their sometimes seemingly irrational and conflicting political decisions.

d — Conflict as Vicious Circle

Intellectuals involved in politics seek a solution to their personal and social conflicts. (Like elitism and populism as political

strategies of socio-economic development.) As it was pointed out in the structural analysis, there is a strong distrust to the intellectuals as a political ally. To overcome this distrust, intellectuals tend to become more and more radical, but their radicalism can also increase this distrust. This can function as another vicious circle of conflict.

Intellectuals tend to bring ideologies into the political process. But however intelligently an ideology is devised, at some point it cannot explain, predict, or direct reality. This gap between their ideology and reality can be another source of conflict. Especially if the intellectual tries to defend his ideology in the purest form as a reaction to this gap, the ideology-reality gap would tend to get larger and larger and another vicious circle would set in.

Intellectuals tend to look at the total picture and to ignore the procedural details. This is how they can achieve the system consciousness anyway. When they are involved in politics, they have to pay attention to the procedural details. If they do not deal with details, their political machinary will not work and they will lose their chance of creating political change. If they are involved in detailed work, this goes against their personal taste. This is another conflict which comes from their political involvement.

Although in the long run the political involvement of the intellectuals can solve some of the conflicts they feel, and provide socio-economic change, it seems that in the short run it only produces more conflicts and tensions for the intellectuals.

C — Historical Context

The historical context is a very important factor to consider in the study of intellectuals' political behavior. Each country has its own particular historical conditions which should be taken into account in the study of that particular country. Therefore, only gross generalizations could be made here with large margin of error.

As far as the historical context is concerned, it might be a good idea to divide developing countries into old and new ones. By the old ones, it is meant, the countries which have their roots in the old empires or states which showed a reasonable continuity and received recognition in history. The old developing societies may or may not have been colonized by Western powers, but in any case they received some amount of socio-political and economic pressure

from the west. China, Iran, Korea, Viet Nam, Thailand can be examples in this category.

The new developing countries are the ones formed by the decline of the Western colonialism, and they have rather weak and questionable historical roots to identify with. Most of the African states can be included in this category.

The old states have some advantages over the new ones on the road to development. They have a sense of identity and continuity which the the new states lack. They have common norms, values and legitimization symbols which are very helpful for the nation building process. An old culture can be a hinderence as well as a help for development. It can help nation building, but the con servative influence of an old culture can prevent further socio- economic and political change. Manipulation of the culture for change requires skillful leadership. With its positive and negative sides, the total impact of an old culture seems to be in favor of a developing society. A new developing society is confronted with the preliminary problem of nation building before it advances on the road of development at all. It is very hard for a new developing society to solve the problem of nation building without the help of a common culture.

Besides its influence on nation building, the old vs. new developing nation dichotomy plays a role in status incongruency. The old nations would have a high status factor because of their respectable historical past. The intellectuals of these nations (who feel this incongruency most) would tend to influence the other sectors of the society presenting the incongruency as a humiliating situation to bear. In these societies it is rather easy to develop mobilization systems because in the first place there are common cultural symbols to rally people around, and secondly the people have some feeling for the status incongruency their nation faces. What is left for intellectuals is to sharpen this vague and undefined feeling of status incongruency that people feel and put it in the focus of their historical splendor. In these societies there are strong cultural symbols attached to the glorious historical past. Manipulation of these symbols can be basis for mobilization.

Thus, in old developing nations, there is correspondence between the conflict an intellectual feels and the possibilities of social mobilization toward development which eventually will solve this conflict. In these societies, the intellectual in a sense is unlucky

because he has higher conflict stemming from the status incongruency developed from his historical past. On the other hand, he is lucky because the same historical past gives him a weapon with wich to mobilize society to reduce social and personal conflicts through development.

In the new developing societies the situation is quite different. The intellectuals still feel conflict in these societies, Probably the only comforting possibily for him is the lack of the status incongruency that would stem from a historical past. Aside from that one, all other sources of conflict work for him. Actually he can have more conflict than the intellectual of an old developing society because of his tribal background and racial situation. Since most of the new developing societies are in Africa, the conflict between tribal loyalties and the new found intellectual orientation would tend to be quite strong. (This resembles the conflict between the primary group socialization and educational institutions.) On the other hand, the more he advances in educational institutions, in bureaucracy, in politics, and in his profession, the more his interaction with Western ideas and personalities will increase, and the more he will become aware of prejudice against his race. When he is most Westernized, he will realize that he is the farthest away from the West. At that point he can turn back to his own society. But where? To his tribe? This will be a strong contrast to all his intellectual advancement. To his "nation"? But these is not one. To his history? He does not have a respectable historical past unless he creates one or digs out one. (Apter, 1964 : 190 - 191).

The intellectual of a new developing society may score higher on the felt conflicts than the intellectual of an old developing society because of the above reasons. In spite of higher conflicts, he does not have a very good chance of mobilizing his society toward a developmental end. In this sense, his felt conflict does not correspond to possibilities of political organization that his society offers.([8]) As it was seen, this relationship is rather positive in old developing societies.

There are several reasons for the lack of mobilization systems in the new developing societies. Tribal divisions, lack of common norms and common cultural symbols, lack of common legitimization symbols, lack of unifying hictorical bondage, lack of experience

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(8) Nkrumah tried to develop a mobilization system in Ghana, but was unsuccessful.

in self-government, lack of trust in themselves, do not let a mobilization system work to rally people around the common and distant goal of development. Cultural, social, and economic change require huge personal and social sacrifices. These sacrifices cannot be made without commitment to certain goals beyond the existing level of satisfaction. A society torn apart by the division and conflicts as cited above cannot mobilize and commit itself to make the required sacrifice.

A mobilization system is not the only way a society can develop. It appeals to intellectuals because it is faster, and makes the planned and conscious change possible. Of course not all of the old developing societies have mobilization systems. Iran and Thailand are on the road toward development without mobilization systems. Established and legitimized political institutions of these two societies (with very little colonial experience) are providing necessary framework for socio-political mobility. But these societies have a long way to go to come out of the state of underdevelopment. Still there is a possibility that they can adopt a mobilization system at some point in their development.

D — Personality Dimensions ·

Personality characteristics of intellectuals tend to either produce new conflicts or aggravate the old ones. One of the basic personality characteristics of an intellectual develops from the nature of his occupation. He tends to work with his mind more than with his hands. Theoretical thinking and the capacity for abstraction are important elements of his mentality. The inevitable conflict between theory and reality makes itself felt on the behavior of the intellectual.

The next result of theoretical thinking is the critical attitude. The intellectual criticizes his social environment according to a theory of perfect society in his mind. But criticism is not an institutionalized social and political behavior pattern in transitional societies. He sees harsh reactions against his critical attitude. This unacceptable critical attitude develops new conflicts between him and his socio-political environment while it enhances the old conflicts.

Another conflict stemming from his theoretical thinking is the conflict between the general view and detailed task. The intellectual tends to look at the whole picture and evaluates his environment

with this generalist attitude. But the detail work (which has to be done, if anyting is to be accomplished keeps pushing him to the areas in which he has neither the desire nor the ability to function.

System consciousness and empathy characteristics of the intellectual help him perceive the conflicts in his environment. In this sense they may not produce conflict by themselves, but facilitate the perception of the outside conflicts.

The above reasoning can help to clarify the general belief that political intelligentsia tends to come from the students of the humanities rather than from the students of the sciences. The gap between theory and reality is much wider in the humanities than in the sciences. Besides other important reasons, this can be one of the causes for the high conflict, frustration, and political involvement for students of humanities.

The personality characteristics of the intellectuals which were briefly discussed above tend to create conflicts as welle as to highlight the conflicts in their environment. (Coser, 1965 : viii; Shils, 1969 : 43; Michels, 1960 : 317 - 318; Malia, 1961 : 4).

4 — Results of the Conflicts

The first result of these conflicts is the identity crises. The conflict stemming from the "relatively classless stratum" situation, from the discontinuity of socialization process, and form the international context produce an inadequate definition of the self and self's relation to the social environment.

The intellectual feels the need for a clear definition of self, and tries to develop a stable, acceptable, and predictable relationship between the self and its environment.

This search for identity produces some political results. At first, a change orientation sets in. The crises stiuation is an unsatisfying psychological experience. It has to be changed and a new definition and new relationships have to be developed. To the degree that the intellectual sees the existing social system as the cause of his dissatisfaction, he will direct his change demands to the socio-political structure. System consciousness and empathy make it easier for him to locate the sources of his discontent in the socio-political system.

Populism will be another result of the identity crises. In a sense, the "public" develops as another reference model for the intellec-

tuals to solve their identity crises. On the one hand the populist psychology serves as a device to reduce the guilt feelings of the intellectual, on the other hand the "public" serves as a model to identify with.

Finally, the ideological orientation can be pointed out as another result of the conflicts and identity crises. Ideologies give clearcut definitions of the individual's role in society and in history. Ideologies prescribe definite relationship patterns between the individual and his social environment. They tend to have clear-cut explanations for the causes of the social conflicts and propose ways to solve these conflicts. Because of these definitive qualities, ideologies gain an important place in the change oriented politics of the intellectuals who suffer from the role conflict in transitional societies.

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Ö Z E T

AYDINLARIN VE GELİŞME SÜRECİNDEKİ ROLLERİNİN SOSYOLOJİK BİR ÇÖZÜMLEMESİ

Aydınlar çeşitli şekillerde tanımlanmışlardır. Kavramsal tanımlar içinde; toplumsal yapıyı, rolü, kişilik özelliklerini ele alanlar ve fenomenalist tanımlar görülüyor. Ayrıca, çeşitli işlevsel tanımlar da göze çarpıyor. Burada, bağlam (context) göz önüne alınarak bir tanıma ulaşılmağa çalışıldı. Bu tanımda, Sistem Bilinçliliği, Empathy, Siyasal Mükemmelcilik ve Eleştirisel Yönelim ögeleri "aydın oluşun" tanımındaki temel değişkenler olarak benimsendi.

Makaledeki ana öneri şudur: Aydınlar, gelişen toplumlarda, çelişki içinde olduklarını hissederler. Bu çelişkileri çözümlemek için uçsal politikaya yönelirler. Referans grupları, statü uyuşmazlığı, rol çelişkisi gibi kavramlar çözümlemede geniş ölçüde kullanıldı. Çelişkilerin kaynakları olarak, uluslararası ve sosyo-politik düzen, tarihsel etkiler ve kişilik ögeleri ele alındı.

Sosyo-politik düzenin katkıları incelenirken; yapısal nedenler, birincil - ikincil grupların toplumsallaştırmadaki (socialization) etkileri, rol çelişkileri, elitçilik-halkçılık çelişkileri ele alındı ve çelişkinin giderek bir kısır döngüye dönüştüğü saptandı.

Çelişkilerin doğurduğu sonuçlar incelenirken, kişilik bunalımları, bunun doğurduğu değişim yönelimi, halkçılık eğilimi ve ideolojik eğilimler üzerinde duruldu.